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Abstract
I argue that, contrary to an idea to be found in popularizations of time 
travel, one cannot more easily multiply oneself by taking younger ver-
sions of oneself back in time than by travelling back in time on one’s 
own. The reason is that the suggested multiplication of the traveller is, 
from a global perspective, only apparent.
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1
Most philosophers think that travelling back in time is at least logi-
cally possible, because it does not entail changing the past1 and be-
cause other arguments against self-consistent time travel are not 
compelling2. I am with the majority on this issue. However, travel-
ling into the past can have strange consequences. One is outlined by 
P. Davies:
Travel into the past takes an air of absurdity when the time traveller 
meets his younger self, for then there will be two of him. […] And 
it needn’t stop there. You could invite your (slightly) younger self to 
accompany you in a similar trip back another day, when there will be 
three of you. Nothing prevents this process being repeated again and 
again. By making successive hops back in time, the time traveller could 
accumulate many copies of himself in one place (Davies 2002: 111).
1 An exception is (Goddu 2003).
2 See, for instance, the arguments in (Grey 1999), and the reply in (Dowe 
2000).
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This suggests that by taking more and more versions of yourself (or 
of any other object around) back in time with you, you could multi-
ply yourself (or any other object around) effortlessly. Indeed, right 
after this passage, Davis suggests that in this way you could get very 
rich very easily using this strategy. Suppose that at 10 o’clock you 
own a gold bar and you have a time machine. You could then take the 
gold bar back in time with you to 9.55. Here, you take the (slightly) 
younger instance of the gold bar along with the older instance of it 
that is already in your hands on a trip back to 9.50. When you arrive 
there will be three gold bars…..and so on…..by hopping back in 
time along with more and more gold bars each hop, you can accumu-
late an enormous quantity of gold.
It is tempting to follow this line of reasoning. However, it is fal-
lacious. In order to see it, focus on 9.55, when an older version of 
yourself exits from the time machine with a gold bar and takes the 
gold bar that a younger version of yourself is holding in her hand in 
order to travel a further five minutes into the past with two gold 
bars. If the gold bar that she takes from her younger self is the same 
one that she takes with her back in time at 10 o’clock, then at 9.55 
it cannot have been taken by her to a trip back to 9.50 (unless she 
brought it back). That this is so is because if she had taken it in the 
past (and not brought it back), the gold bar would have not been there 
at 10 o’clock! And the same, of course, goes for Davies’ original 
example: at 9.55 your younger self cannot go into the past, if she 
will enter the time machine at 10 o’clock. Time travel without con-
tradictions entails that the events that a time traveller encounters in 
her personal time are the very same that everybody else encounters 
in external time; it is just that they are ordered differently3. Thus, 
if you did not (external time) enter a time machine with your older 
self, you will not (personal time) do it. (And what if you try anyway? 
The standard answer is that something would prevent you from do-
ing it: you slip on a banana peel before getting to it, or you change 
your mind, or …  ).
3 Personal time is that which is measured by a clock attached to the traveller, 
such as her heart-beats or her wrist-watch; external time is that measured by a 
clock attached to any object that is at rest with respect to the system of reference 
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This does not mean that you cannot ever take younger or older 
versions of yourself back in time. If you did it (external time), then 
you will do it (personal time). However, taking one or more ver-
sions of yourself into the past would not get you many versions of 
yourself in (roughly) the same place any more easily than coming 
back many times near the same event without any version of you 
by your side. Kidnapping or sharing a time machine with a former 
instance of yourself does not lead to further extravagances in time 
travelling. To see that, consider a simplified spacetime diagram (fig. 
1) that represents the world-line of the time traveller in external 
time by means of one spatial coordinate and one temporal coordi-
nate along two Cartesian axes4. Travelling with a younger version of 
yourself into the past means simply that in your personal time you 
have already travelled into the past, and the fact that you have done 
it with an older version of yourself means simply that your time-line 
bends over very close to a previous part of itself. Your world-line as 
a time traveller is one continuous line in the diagram, which cannot 
bifurcate when you take a younger version of yourself into the past 
with you.
that the non-travellers share (typically, the Earth). If no time travel takes place, 
the distinction between personal time and external collapses (apart from tiny rela-
tivistic corrections). See Lewis 1976, and MacBeath 1982 for a generalized version.
4 Such a diagram is simplified, not only because it represents one spatial di-
mension out of three, but also because it represents spacetime as flat and simply 
connected, which implies local backwards causation if there is to be time travel 
into the past, see Earman (1995: chap. 6). If there is no local backward causation, 
and travelling backwards in time is achieved by means of wormholes or other 
anomalies in a non-simply connected (curved) spacetime, then representing our 
ordinary coordinate time would be more difficult. However, nothing substantial 
hinges on this complication in my argument.
[FIG. 1: World-line of a time travel who ‘kidnaps’ a younger version of 
herself into the past. The dotted parts represent backwards movement 
in public time.]
The only way to get many versions of yourself in (roughly) the same 
place is to bend your world-line so that segments of it will have ex-
actly the same temporal coordinate and nearly the same spatial coor-
dinate, regardless whether you share a time machine with a younger 
version of yourself (as in fig. 1) or not (as in fig. 2).
[FIG. 2: World-line of a time travel who goes back several times to 
(roughly) the same place and meets many versions of herself. Also here 
the dotted parts represent backwards movement in public time.]
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The situation does not change substantially if time travel is instanta-
neous, such as if it is achieved by a ‘jump drive’ or something similar. 
It is true that in that case, the time traveller’s world-line will not be 
continuous. The world-line of such a time traveller would look as 
that in fig. 1 or fig. 2 but without the backward traits (i.e. the dot-
ted parts). However, if we connect in the diagram each departure 
event with its correlate arrival event (according to the personal time 
of the traveller) by a dotted line, and we call the sum of her normal 
world-line segments of the time travel and the dotted segments in 
the diagram her quasi-world-line, we end up with one continuous 
quasi-world-line, which will not bifurcate in the event that a time 
traveller from the future takes a younger self with her into the past 
or future (it will look exactly as those in fig. 1 and fig. 2). The same 
goes, of course, for any objects a time traveller takes along with her.
2
Even if the only ‘multiplication’ of objects and people allowed by 
self-consistent backwards time travel in one temporal dimension is 
that implied by the bends of a traveller’s world-line, one may argue 
that that is good enough to multiply things without much effort, and 
thus to get rich easily. One cannot multiply her investment by mak-
ing successive hops back in time with more and more versions of a 
gold bar with her, but one can take a gold bar back and forth in time 
in order to have many versions of it all gathered at the same time 
roughly in the same place. This is true, but it does not mean that 
time travel would give you free copies of your gold bar. What looks 
like a multiplication from a local perspective is just a bent world-line 
from a global point of view. The best that time travel can get you is a 
(zero rate) loan from a future self of yours. To see the point, consider 
the following story (with the help of Fig. 3). You own a gold bar and 
a time machine. At time t, you put your gold bar on a table in front of 
the time machine and enter the time machine for a 10-year trip into 
the future, at time t’. There, you find the gold bar that you left on the 
table 10 years before, pick it up and take it with you on a trip back 
to time t. Then you put the older version of the bar on the table, and 
you return – empty handed – to t’. Here, you take a still older ver-
sion of the bar and you take it with you to t… Do that n times, stop 
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at t, and you will have n + 1 gold bars that you can spend however 
you like. Or can you?
[FIG. 3: World-line of a time traveller (you) who travel back and forth 
between t and t’ leaving each time on the table at t a version of a gold 
bar that he has taken from the same table at t’. Dotted segments stand 
both for backward and forward time travel. t’ is the ‘Return’ time, 
when all but one gold bar has to be given back.]
To see whether the story is coherent, and its consequences, think of 
it as told by someone witnessing the events at t and a t’. In external 
time, all the arrivals and the departures are simultaneous. At t, n 
versions of the traveller arrive from the future, leave a gold bar on 
the table, and n - 1 of them embark on a travel to the future with 
nothing in their hands. The only version of the traveller who stays 
there (the older one) is indeed left with n + 1 gold bars for her to 
spend however she likes. Yet the story is not over. At t’, n – 1 ver-
sions of the travellers will arrive from the past to take with them a 
gold bar each. If the gold bars weren’t there at t’, at t the traveller could 
not have received them at t. The moral, then, is that the time traveller 
cannot change the n gold bars into currency, spend it all, and forget 
about it. After t’ there will be only one gold bar around. The extra 
richesse she received has to be given back. (What if the time travel 
tries to not give back the extra bars? Again, she will fail, or else she 
would have not received them.) The reason is that from a global per-
spective, no multiplication has taken place. If we look at the interval 
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between t and t’ only, it seems there is more gold than if we had not 
taken the bar to and fro in time. Yet in spacetime as a whole, we find 
as much gold as if the bar had not travelled in time at all. And the 
same goes for persons, of course. If someone’s life span is 75 years 
in personal time, then in spacetime as a whole we find the events 
composing those 75 years; and that is what we find both in the case 
in which one is a frantic time traveller and in the case in which one 
does not travel in time at all.
One may by puzzled by the fact that all departures and arrivals 
happen at the same time. However, it is easy to see that nothing 
hinges on this simplification. Draw (as in Fig. 4) the world-line (or 
quasi-world-line) of a time travelling object O. Call B the event of O’s 
coming into being, and D the event of O’s extinction. Now call L the 
lower arrival from the future of O in the diagram, which occurs at a 
date before which (in external time) O never arrives via backwards 
time travel, and U the upper arrival from the past, which occurs at a 
date after which (in external time) O never arrives via forward time 
travel. It is easy to see that before L, there can exist at most one ver-
sion of O; more precisely, there is one if B occurs before L, none if 
it occurs after. Similarly, after U there can exist at most one version 
of O; more precisely, there is only one if D occurs after U and none 
if it occurs before U.
[FIG. 4]
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We now have sufficient information to draw the conclusion. We can-
not find instances of the gold bar around after the upper limit U 
at which the last (in external time) of our younger selves comes to 
take what has previously been lent to us5. This situation makes all 
the richesse we receive from the future a loan, and not a gift, and in 
general the ‘multiplication’ of persons and objects obtained by time 
travelling is, from a global perspective, just an illusion6.
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